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Abstract
In a two-tier oligopoly model, we examine the foreign direct investment (FDI) entry
decisions of an upstream intermediate good supplier and a downstream final good producer.
We find that the FDI decisions of the two firms may be subject to a coordination problem
that can be solved by an appropriately designed host country subsidy to FDI. Indeed, an
FDI subsidy at one level of the industry may be suﬃcient to induce FDI at both levels.
However, whether FDI at both levels is more desirable for the host country relative to
FDI at only one level (or neither level) depends upon underlying market structure of the
host industry. While vertical integration can also solve the coordination problem, the
integrated firm finds it optimal to not supply the intermediate good to its downstream
competitors in the host country. As a result, FDI by a vertically integrated unit fails to
generate additional backward or forward linkages and can yield lower welfare than FDI by
two independent firms even though vertical integration avoids the double marginalization
problem.
JEL Classifications: F21, F23
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Introduction

The economics literature has paid significant attention to the determinants of foreign direct
investment (FDI). Two distinct questions have been addressed. The first question is locational: when and why firms opt for FDI over exporting? The second question pertains to the
organizational form of foreign entry: given that production is to be shifted abroad, what is the
optimal entry mode of FDI? The typical menu of organizational choices considered includes
technology licensing, the formation of a joint venture, or the establishment of a wholly owned
subsidiary.1 These two strands of the literature on FDI have enriched our understanding of
real-world patterns of FDI and its eﬀects on host countries. However, most of this literature
has focused almost exclusively on FDI in a single-tier industry; relatively few attempts have
been made to study the entry decisions of multinationals into diﬀerent levels of a verticallyrelated industry. In this paper, we build a two-tier oligopoly model that studies firm incentives
for FDI and the eﬀects of such FDI on the host country.
Given the complementarity of production in vertically related industries, it stands to reason
that decisions regarding FDI into such industries are likely to be interdependent. For example, a
foreign firm may not enter the host country if it foresees diﬃculties in sourcing key intermediate
goods locally. But such goods could be supplied by another foreign investor. If so, FDI by
an intermediate good supplier can enhance the FDI incentive of a final good producer by
helping lower the local price of the intermediate good and/or improving its quality. Similarly,
an upstream/intermediate good producer may not find it attractive to undertake FDI into a
country unless FDI into the downstream sector occurs to generate suﬃcient demand for the
intermediate good. Thus, an important insight underlying our model is that FDI into one type
of production activity may induce additional FDI into related upstream and/or downstream
activities. Casual observation suggests that the aspects of FDI we attempt to model are highly
relevant in the real world. For example, the investment of Japanese auto-makers in Southeast
Asian countries in the 1970s and 1980s was accompanied by investment by the producers of
auto parts and subsystems.2 More generally, global FDI flows occur in virtually all interrelated sectors of the world economy, including resource sectors, manufacturing, distribution,
1

See, for example, Saggi (1996), Buckley and Casson (1998), Makusen and Venables (1999), Helpman, Melitz
and Yeaple (2004), and Nocke and Yeaple (2007).
2
Moran (1998) provides a comprehensive survey of the eﬀects of FDI on the economic development of host
countries.
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and services.
In our two-tiered model, two foreign investors — one that produces an intermediate good
and another that produces a final good — decide independently whether or not to enter a host
country. FDI entry by either firm incurs a fixed cost and potentially generates technological
spillovers for local firms in that sector, which reduce their marginal cost of production.3 The
interdependence of the decision making of the two investors manifests itself in the form of
multiple Nash equilibria. More specifically, if fixed entry costs are large, there exist two Nash
equilibria — one in which both firms enter and the other in which neither does. The no-entry
equilibrium can exist even when entry at both levels is profitable if both firms choose to invest.
Under such circumstances, a coordination problem characterizes the decision making of firms.4
The existence of the coordination problem implies that an appropriately designed government subsidy to FDI at one level of the two-tiered industry may yield multiple benefits for the
host country by inducing FDI at both levels. For example, an FDI subsidy in the upstream
sector can make entry a dominant strategy for the foreign firm producing the intermediate
good. Observing this, the foreign firm producing the final good, that otherwise would not
have entered the local market, will choose to enter as well.5 Our model fits well with Rodrik’s
(1996) argument that in the absence of scale economies in production, for coordination failures
to exist between upstream and downstream industries there must be some type of imperfect
tradability for some of the goods, services, or technologies associated with manufacturing. In
our stylized model, such imperfect tradability arises because both goods need to produced
locally in the host country.
Unlike much of the existing literature on coordination failures, we also consider vertical
integration as a solution to the coordination problem. If vertically integrated, the two foreign
investors no longer face a coordination problem since the integrated unit can always choose
to enter at both levels of the industry. However, the vertically integrated firm is subject
3

Recent literature on the spillover eﬀects of FDI includes Aitken and Harrison (1999), Blomstrom and Kokko
(1998), and Javorcik (2004).
4
See Pack and Westphal (1986) and Okuno-Fujiwara (1988) for early and influential analyses of how coordination failures can arise during industralization and the types of policies government can use to address such
failures.
5
Coordination problems arising from production and investment complementarities are not the only reason
why FDI sometimes fail to occur. For example, Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) have shown that the informational
disadvantage faced by foreign investors relative to domestic ones can also make capital internationally immobile.
They also show that subsidies to capital inflows by capital importing countries can sometimes be optimal in
order to address the "lemons" problem created by the presence of such type of asymmetric information.
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to an important incentive constraint since it takes into account the fact that supplying the
intermediate good to rival downstream producers hurts the profitability of its downstream
business. To internalize this negative externality, one would expect the vertically integrated
firm to typically produce a smaller quantity of the intermediate good relative to an independent
intermediate good supplier. This intuition is borne out rather sharply in our model: the
negative eﬀect of supplying rival firms the intermediate good turns out to be so strong that
the vertically integrated firm chooses to not supply its downstream competitors at all. This
naturally implies that the vertically integrated firm foregoes profits that could be earned by
supplying the intermediate to local final good producers. As a result, there exist circumstances
where a vertically integrated firm is less likely to undertake FDI than two independent firms.
For example, we find that the joint profits of two independent firms are higher than that of
a vertically integrated unit when the local final good market is highly competitive (i.e. the
number of downstream competitors is large).
Furthermore, even though the vertical integrated unit avoids the double marginalization
problem that characterizes oligopolistic market interaction between independent upstream and
downstream firms, the incentive of such a firm to not supply the intermediate good to local
final good producers can have adverse welfare consequences for the host country. Indeed, we
find that the entry of a vertically integrated firm is preferable to that of two independent
firms only if the downstream market is suﬃciently competitive; otherwise, the host country is
better oﬀ with independent entry at both stages. Interestingly, the decisions of foreign firms
regarding vertical integration turn out to be in harmony with local welfare considerations only
when market structure at both levels is moderately competitive.
Our two-tier model also shows that greater technological spillovers from FDI to local competitors can actually encourage FDI under certain conditions. This occurs because higher
spillovers at one level of the industry intensify post-FDI competition at that stage, which
makes FDI into the other stage more attractive and due to complementarity in production
this indirectly enhances the incentive for FDI into the first stage. For instance, an increase
in FDI spillovers in the final goods market increases derived demand for the intermediate
good, making FDI into the intermediate stage more attractive. And FDI into the intermediate
good makes FDI into the final good relatively more profitable. A similar logic implies that
an increase in technological spillovers in the intermediate market can increase the incentives
for FDI at both stages of production. To the best of our knowledge, this positive relationship
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between incentives for FDI and the degree of technological spillovers has not been studied in
the existing literature. Indeed, in models with only stage of production, greater spillovers from
FDI at that stage will generally make FDI less likely.
Existing studies of FDI entry decisions have focused almost exclusively on entry into one
level of the host industry — i.e. the final product market. For example, in a recent paper Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) investigate how firm heterogeneity (e.g., in cost) aﬀects the
choice between exporting and FDI. Nocke and Yeaple (2007) construct a model in which multinationals can enter the host country either by greenfield investment or cross-border merger
and acquisition while Eicher and Kang (2005) incorporate exports as an alternative way of
serving the foreign market. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is among a handful of
papers that study FDI at multiple levels of a vertically related industry. Like us, Markusen
and Venables (1999) study the eﬀects of FDI on the host economy in a two-tier industry, but
they consider FDI only into the downstream market. In addition, their monopolistic model
abstracts from strategic interaction among foreign investors that are central to our oligopoly
model. Lin and Saggi (2007) consider the eﬀects of downstream FDI in a two-tier model but
they focus on the eﬀects of an exclusivity condition that a multinational might impose on local
suppliers in return from transferring technology to them.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our basic model of
FDI in a two-tier industry and it highlights the coordination problem between entry decisions
of an intermediate good supplier and a final good producer. Section 3 compares the welfare
eﬀects of various patterns of FDI. Section 4 examines how technology spillovers at both levels
of the vertical industry aﬀect incentives for FDI. Section 5 compares the FDI incentive a
vertically integrated firm with that of two independent firms. Section 6 discusses the case of
export-oriented FDI while section 7 concludes.

2

Model

We consider a host economy that produces two final goods (x and y) and an intermediate good
(z). Good x serves as the numeraire and is produced by a perfectly competitive sector. Labor
is the only factor of production. One unit of labor produces one unit of good x so that price
of good x equals the wage rate in the economy that is normalized to 1.
Consumer preferences over the two goods are as follows: U (x, y) = x + u(y). Since preferences are quasi-linear, the inverse demand function for good y can be written as p(y).To
5

facilitate analytical derivations, we assume that u(y) is quadratic so that p(y) = a − y.

One unit of good y requires one unit of good z. From hereon, we refer to good y as simply

‘the final good’ and good z as ‘the intermediate good’. There exist n ≥ 1 downstream firms

that produce the final good and m ≥ 1 upstream firms (called local suppliers) that produce

the intermediate. Each local supplier’s unit cost of production equals cI > 0. The marginal
cost of a final good producer equals the sum of the price of the intermediate, denoted by w,
and the unit cost of transforming the intermediate into final good, denoted by c > 0.

A foreign producer of the intermediate good, called firm A, and a foreign producer of the
final good, called firm B, are contemplating entry via greenfield FDI into the host country
industry. The fixed cost of FDI entry at the intermediate stage equals F ≥ 0 while that at

the final good stage equals G ≥ 0. Each foreign firms possesses a cost advantage over its local

competitors. Specifically, the unit cost of production for firm A equals cA , where cA ≤ cI ,
while that of firm B is cB , where cB ≤ c.6

We assume that incoming FDI has the potential to generate technology spillovers to local

firms and we model such spillovers as follows. Upon FDI by firm A, the unit cost of each local
supplier i becomes
ci = cI − sA (cI − cA ) = cA + (1 − sA )∆A , i = 1, 2, ..., m,
where sA ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of technological spillover at the intermediate stage,
and ∆A ≡ cI − cA represents the cost diﬀerential between local suppliers and firm A (in the

absence of any spillovers). Similarly, FDI by firm B at the final good stage reduces the cost
of production of each domestic producer j to
cj = c − sB (cI − cA ) = cB + (1 − sB )∆B ,

j = 1, 2, ..., n,

where sB ∈ [0, 1] is the spillover parameter in the downstream market and ∆B ≡ c − cB equals

the cost advantage of the firm B over its local competitors (in the absence of any spillovers).

The timing of the game is as follows. First, the two foreign firms simultaneously decide
whether or not to enter the host country. Then, as in Salinger (1988), interaction between
suppliers of the intermediate good and producers of the final good occurs as follows. Taking
the unit price of the intermediate as given, all final good producers compete in quantities
6

In what follows, we assume that the cost advantages of the foreign firms are not so large that foreign entry
leads to exit of local firms.
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(i.e. Cournot fashion). And given the derived demand generated by downstream competition,
intermediate good suppliers compete in quantities, which establishes the equilibrium price of
the intermediate. It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium price of the intermediate
good under autarky (or no FDI entry) denoted by hN i equals
wN =

2.1

a − c + mcI
m+1

(1)

FDI at the intermediate stage

Let π A
A (sA , m, n) denote the equilibrium profit of firm A (gross of entry cost) if it enters the host
country but firm B does not. Under this market structure, denoted by hAi, derived demand
for the intermediate good is as the same as that under autarky. If firm A enters the local

market, the number of suppliers of the intermediate good increases relative to autarky, and
the cost configurations of these suppliers may also change because of technological spillovers
from firm A.
Increased competition upstream and the possible cost reduction implied by such spillovers
lowers the equilibrium price of the intermediate good which in turn benefits downstream final
goods producers — i.e. FDI upstream creates additional forward linkages in the local industry.
Furthermore, it also lowers the price of the final good and increases consumer surplus relative
to autarky. At the same time, however, FDI entry by firm A hurts local suppliers of the
intermediate good by increasing competition in that market. The equilibrium price of the
intermediate good under hAi is easily calculated:
wA =

a − c + m(cI − sA ∆A ) + cA
m+2

(2)

where it is straightforward that wA < wN .

2.2

FDI into the final good

Let π B
B (sB , m, n) denote the equilibrium profit of firm B under the market structure hBi where

it enters but firm A does not. FDI entry by firm B intensifies competition in the final good
market by increasing the number of firms and by generating FDI spillovers to local downstream
firms. Increased competition downstream raises derived demand for the intermediate good and
the sales of upstream suppliers increase — i.e. FDI downstream creates additional backward
7

linkages in the local industry. Increased competition in the downstream sector also enhances
consumer welfare. The negative eﬀect of firm B’s entry on the host country is that it increases
competition in the final good market so that market shares and profits of local final good
producers tend to decline due to firm B’s entry (unless the spillover eﬀects are suﬃciently
strong). The equilibrium price of the intermediate good under the FDI entry pattern hBi
equals

a − (cB + n(c − sB ∆B )/(n + 1)) + mcI
.
m+1
and wB > wN if cB = c.
wB =

where wB ≥ wN

2.3

(3)

FDI at both levels

Denote the FDI entry pattern where both firms A and B enter the local industry by hABi.

As is clear, under hABi the degree of competition in the local industry increases at both

stages of production and this lowers prices of both the intermediate good and the final good.

Furthermore, local firms at both levels of the industry may enjoy the benefits of spillovers from
FDI.
AB
Let π AB
A (sA , sB , m, n) and π B (sA , sB , m, n) denote the equilibrium profits of firm A and

firm B, respectively under the FDI entry pattern hABi. It is obvious that
A
• π AB
A (sA , sB , m, n) > π A (sA , m, n); and that
B
• π AB
B (sA , sB , m, n) > π B (sA , m, n).

In other words, each foreign firm earns greater profit from entering the host market if the
other foreign firm also enters the other tier of the vertically related market than if it does not.
For example, firm A’s profit is greater if both firms A and B enter the local market relative
to when firm A enters alone. This is due to two reasons. First, firm B’s entry intensifies
competition in the downstream sector and this increases demand for the intermediate good.
Second, technological spillovers generated by firm B also benefit firm A: such spillovers in the
final good market enable local firms to produce a larger quantity of the final good thereby
creating more demand for the intermediate good.
It is straightforward to derive the equilibrium price of the intermediate good under hABi:
¸
∙
1
cB + n(c − sB ∆B )
AB
+ m(cI − sA ∆A ) + cA
=
(4)
a−
w
m+2
n+1
where α ≡ a − cA − cB , SA ≡ (1 − sA )∆A , and SB ≡ (1 − sB )∆B .
8

2.4

The FDI entry game

Firms A and B simultaneously and independently decide whether or not to enter the host
country. The payoﬀ matrix of this FDI entry game is as follows.
Firm B
Firm A

Enter (E)
Not Enter (N )

Enter (E)
π AB
−
F, π AB
A
B −G
0,
πB
B −G

Not Enter (N )
πA
0
A − F,
0,
0

Depending on parameter values, each of the four cells can arise as an equilibrium outcome:
AB
B
AB
hAi obtains if π A
A > F but π B ≤ G; hBi obtains if π B > G but π A ≤ F ; hABi results

BB > G; and the autarkic market structure hN i persists if π A ≤ F and
if π AB
A > F and π B
A

πB
B ≤ G . The equilibrium pattern of the FDI entry game is depicted in Figure 1.
— Insert Figure 1 —

For parameter values in Region I of Figure 1, entry costs are so low that it is a dominant
strategy for both firms A and B to enter. In Region II, entry is the dominant strategy for B
but not for firm A; it is worthwhile for firm A to enter only if firm B enters as well. Similarly,
in Region IV, entry is the dominant strategy for firm A but not for firm B, and firm B enters
only if firm A does so as well. In Region III, two Nash equilibria coexist. In one equilibrium
both firms enter while in the other neither firm does. Obviously, the two firms are better
oﬀ under the first Nash equilibrium. The coexistence of {N, N } in Region III highlights the
coordination problem faced by the two firms while making independent decisions regarding
entry at the two stages of the vertically linked industry in the host country.
AB
Proposition 1 (Coordination problem of FDI): If π A
A (sA , m, n) < F < π A (sA , sB , m, n)
AB
and π B
B (sB , m, n) < G < π B (sA , sB , m, n), then both {E, E} and {N, N } are Nash equilibria

of the FDI entry game.

Perhaps the purest illustration of the coordination problem characterizing FDI into the
vertically related industry can be provided by the case where m = n = 0. When local industry
is non-existent at both levels, the absence of FDI implies that the final good is not supplied
to the local economy at all. Under such a scenario, the coordination problem manifests itself
9

in two starkly diﬀerent Nash equilibria: one in which domestic welfare is zero and another in
which it is strictly positive. In general, it is easy to show that the degree of the coordination
problem declines with the degree of local industrial development: i.e. an increase in industry
scale either upstream (as measured by m) or downstream (as measured by n) reduces the
parameter space over which {N, N } obtains as a Nash equilibria. We can show that:
B
A
∂(π AB
∂(π AB
B − πB )
A − πA)
< 0 and
<0
∂m
∂n
i.e. an increase in the number of domestic suppliers reduces the dependence of firm B on firm

A’s entry decision while an increase in the number of domestic final good producers reduces
the dependence of firm A’s entry decision on that of firm B.
The coordination problem facing the two firms can be overcome in at least two separate
ways. First, the host country could subsidize FDI thereby making entry a dominant strategy
for one of them; which in turn induces the other firm to enter even if it is not subsidized.7
The other way to solve the coordination problem is for firms A and B to enter as a vertically
integrated entity — a strategy we consider in section 5. In order to examine the desirability of
a FDI subsidy policy, in the following section, we first study the welfare eﬀects of FDI on the
host industry. An interesting insight of this analysis is that it is not always the case that the
host country is better oﬀ with FDI at both levels of the industry.

3

Patterns of FDI and domestic welfare

In this section we examine two important questions from the viewpoint of the host country.
First, how are diﬀerent patterns of FDI patterns related in terms of domestic welfare? Second,
do the various patterns of FDI necessarily increase domestic welfare compared to autarky?
The existing literature on FDI has emphasized two types of benefits of FDI to the host
country: technological spillovers to domestic firms at the level of the industry at which FDI
occurs (see Saggi, 2002 for an in-depth discussion) and the vertical linkages (both backward
and forward) generated within the domestic industry — see Rodriguez-Clare (1996), Markusen
and Venables (1999), and Lin and Saggi (2007).
As was already noted, when market structure is oligopolistic FDI also generates a competition eﬀect since multinationals gain market share at the expense of competing local firms.
7

It is worth noting that fiscal and financial incentives designed to attract FDI are widespread in the global
economy (UNCTAD, 2003).
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However, besides this usual horizontal competition eﬀect of FDI, in our model, FDI has an
additional negative eﬀect on local firms that arises due to the two-tier production structure
we consider. For example consider the FDI entry pattern hBi relative to autarky. The entry

of firm B increases derived demand for the intermediate good which in turn raises its price —

an outcome that is detrimental to local final good producers. This indirect price eﬀect of firm
B’s entry, together with increased competition in the downstream market, makes such entry
doubly problematic for local competitors of firm B. It is easy to see that the same argument
applies with respect to a comparison of FDI entry patterns hABi and hAi. In fact, using
(1),(2) and (3) we can show the following lemma:

Lemma 1: If cB < c, then wB > wN and wAB > wA , for all sA and sB . That is, FDI
entry by firm B raises costs of its local competitors by increasing the price of the intermediate
good.8
Let π kz (sA , sB , m, n) denote the equilibrium profit of a typical local supplier in the intermediate sector and and π ky (sA , sB , m, n) that of a local final good producer under FDI entry
pattern k, where k = hN i, hAi, hBi, or hABi. Aggregate domestic welfare is then given by
W k ≡ mπ kz (sA , sB , m, n) + nπ ky (sA , sB , m, n) + CS k (sA , sB , m, n)
where CS k denotes the domestic consumer welfare under FDI entry pattern k.
We are now ready to study the welfare properties of diﬀerent FDI entry patterns. We
initially ignore technology spillovers and concentrate on the welfare eﬀects of FDI that result
from its impact on market structure and vertical linkages in the domestic industry. Once these
eﬀects are clearly understood, we then discuss the impact of technology spillovers.

3.1

Is more FDI necessarily better?

To concentrate on the trade-oﬀ between the beneficial linkage eﬀects of FDI and its negative
competition eﬀects, in this section we abstract from technology spillovers from FDI and set
sA = 0 and sB = 0. For simplicity, we assume that firms A and B do not have any cost
advantages over their counterparts in the host country. In fact, as we shall see in the next
section, the competition eﬀects of FDI almost dominate the linkage eﬀects even when foreign
firms do not possess any cost-advantages over their local competitors.
8

If cB = c, then firm B’s entry changes the slope but not the vertical intercept of the derived demand for
the intermediate good. In this case, we have wB = wN and wAB = wA .
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Our first result below is rather surprising in that it shows that in an economy that has
production capabilities at both stages, opening up to FDI at only level of the local industry
can sometimes be more desirable than opening up at both levels:
Proposition 2: Suppose cA = cI and cB = c so that technological spillovers from FDI are
irrelevant. Then,
(i) W A > W AB for all m and n and W A = W AB holds only if m = n = 1;
(ii) W B > W AB for all m and n.
In other words, given that there are no spillovers from FDI, the host country is better oﬀ
with FDI at just one level of the market as opposed to both, except for the case where the
domestic market is a successive monopoly. This result places an important qualification on the
intuitive notion that the complementarity of FDI into two stages of production of a vertically
related industry necessarily implies that FDI at both stages is necessarily more beneficial to
the host country than FDI at a single stage. The logic for this surprising result is as follows.
Relative to FDI into just one level, FDI at both levels partially oﬀsets the vertical linkages
created while at the same time creating additional competition for local firms. For example,
consider entry by firm B, which increases backward linkages by increasing demand for the
intermediate good and thereby benefits local suppliers. Now imagine that firm B’s entry into
the final good market is accompanied by firm A’s entry into the intermediate market. As a
result, the backward linkage eﬀect of firm B’s entry is now partially captured by firm A, whose
profits are not a component of domestic welfare.
Similarly, compare entry patterns hABi and hAi. As firm A enters, it creates a forward

linkage eﬀect that benefits local final good producers. However, a part of this forward linkage

eﬀect accrues to firm B if it too enters the host country. In sum, while complementary to one
another, FDI at both stages of production partially oﬀsets the linkage benefits conferred on the
host industry by FDI at only one stage of production. Finally, note that when the domestic
market is heavily lacking in competition, as is the case under successive local monopoly, the
benefits of increased competition implied by FDI at both stages of production outweigh the
oﬀsetting of linkages caused by such FDI relative to FDI at only one stage of the local industry.9
9

It can be shown that whether or not entry pattern hAi leads to higher domestic welfare than entry pattern
hBi depends on values of m and n. Loosely speaking, hBi is better than hAi if n is suﬃciently large relative to
m. It is worth noting that if market structure at the two stages of production is symmetric (i.e. m = n) then
FDI entry in the final good market is preferable: W B > W A .
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Our results above regarding the oﬀsetting aﬀects of FDI on vertical linkages are reminiscent
of an insightful point made by Rodriguez-Clare (1996) who observed that incoming FDI does
not just create new linkages, it also displaces existing linkages between local firms at diﬀerent
stages of the production chain. Such displacement also occurs in our model since FDI reduces
the output levels of firms that compete with the multinational(s). By considering the impact
of FDI at two vertically related stages of production, our model further extends this insight of
Rodriguez-Clare (1996): given that a multinational has entered the local industry, the entry of
a multinational at another, vertically linked stage of production ends up severing some vertical
links between the first multinational entrant and the local industry, something that can be
detrimental for local welfare.

3.2

Comparison with autarky

Given the relative welfare ranking of various FDI entry patterns, it is natural to ask: under
what conditions does each FDI entry pattern make the host country better oﬀ relative to
autarky? The result here is analogous to Proposition 2: in the absence of FDI spillovers, FDI
into one or both levels of the domestic industry increases domestic welfare if and only if the
domestic industry is (almost) a successive monopoly under autarky.
Proposition 3: Suppose cA = cI and cB = c. Then, the following hold:
(i) W A > W N if m = n = 1 and W A < W N otherwise;
(ii) W B > W N if (m, n) ∈ {(1, 1), (2, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2)} and W B < W N otherwise; and

(iii) W AB > W N if m = n = 1 and W AB < W N otherwise.

This result can be understood in terms of the competition eﬀect of FDI on local firms.
As the host country opens up to FDI either in the intermediate or the final good market, or
both markets, the resulting intensification of competition lowers profits of those firms that
compete with the foreign firms. When spillovers from FDI are absent, the competition eﬀect
is so strong that it dominates the vertical linkage eﬀects of FDI as well as the beneficial eﬀects
on consumers so that domestic welfare declines, except for the cases where m and n are both
close to 1. In other words, unless there is very little domestic competition at each level of the
domestic industry, increasing competition in the local industry is not suﬃcient justification
for further opening up to FDI since the increase in competition also transfers rents to foreign
firms. In this context, it is worth noting that if the domestic industry comprised of a single
stage of production with Cournot competition, under the assumptions of our model, foreign
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entry into the industry would necessarily reduce domestic welfare if it is not accompanied
by any technological spillovers to the local industry. By contrast, in our two-tiered oligopoly
model, FDI has the potential to enhance welfare even when there are no technology spillovers
provided that market concentration in the domestic industry is rather high (i.e. m and n are
small). In other words, the presence of market power at both stages of production actually
makes FDI more attractive since it implies that some of the profit destruction in the final good
market that results from increased foreign competition is captured by domestic suppliers of
the intermediate good.
Proposition 3 suggests that the usual backward linkage eﬀects that economists have long
recognized may not be significant enough to justify policies aimed at attracting FDI. This
raises the question whether a case for pro-active FDI policies in oligopolistic markets could be
made on the basis of technological spillovers to local firms. We examine this possibility next.

4

Eﬀects of FDI spillovers

Proposition 3 informs us that in the absence of spillovers, FDI into the local industry increases
domestic welfare only when the industry is either a successive monopoly (in case FDI occurs in
the intermediate market) or a successive duopoly (in case FDI occurs in the final good market).
We show below that the presence of FDI spillovers increases the parameter range for which
FDI increases domestic welfare relative to autarky. We use the FDI pattern hABi to illustrate
this argument. The analysis below also provides a rationale for the FDI subsidization policies
that are considered at the end of this section.

4.1

Spillovers and the desirability of FDI

Now consider the case where the FDI entry of firms A and B generates technological spillovers
to the local economy — the spillover parameters sA and sB are strictly positive. We show
that in the presence of spillovers, entry by A and B can enhance domestic welfare, even
when the domestic market is not highly concentrated at both levels. For simplicity, consider
the symmetric case where cA = cB = 0, cI = c = ∆ and sA = sB = s. The parameter ∆
then represents the cost advantage each foreign firm enjoys over its local competitors. As
might be expected, domestic welfare W AB depends on the level of spillovers as well as on the
cost diﬀerential parameter: W AB = W AB (s, ∆) where W AB increases with the level of FDI
spillovers s while it decreases with the cost advantage ∆ of foreign firms.
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An example: successive duopoly For the special case where m = n = 2, cA = cB =
0, cI = c = ∆ and sA = sB = s, we have
W

AB

1
1
1
(3a − 8(1 − s)∆)2 +
(9a − 28(1 − s)∆)2 +
(s, ∆) =
96
1152
2

µ

¶2
9
3
a − (1 − s)∆ .
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It can be shown that the following holds:
Proposition 4: Assume cA = cB = 0, cI = c = ∆, m = n = 2, and ∆ ≥ ∆min > 0, then

there exists a threshold level of spillovers s∗ (∆) such that W AB (s, ∆) > W N if and only if
s > s∗ (∆). Furthermore, s∗ (∆) decreases with ∆.
This result is easy to understand. For the extreme case where spillovers are complete
(i.e. s = 1) domestic welfare under hABi exceeds that under autarky because FDI by both
firms lowers the cost of all domestic firms by the amount ∆ and this cost reduction dominates

the negative eﬀects of increased competition on the profitability of local firms. Given that
domestic welfare is an increasing function of the spillover parameter s, there exists a threshold
level s∗ (∆) that exhibits the above property. For example, for a = 10, it is easy to calculate
that ∆min = 0.2, s∗ = 0.36 if ∆ = 0.5 and s∗ = 0.06 if ∆ = 2.

4.2

How spillovers may encourage FDI

The conventional belief is that technology spillovers tend to discourage FDI since multinationals have an incentive to preserve their technological superiority over local firms. In this
section, we show that this argument may be incomplete since it ignores vertical linkage eﬀects
that lie at the heart of our model. We argue below that an increase in the degree of spillover
may actually increase the incentive for FDI on the part of foreign firms.
Suppose that the level of upstream spillover (sA ) rises. Following this, π AB
A decreases but
π AB
B increases since the price of the intermediate good falls. The new equilibrium entry pattern
as a function of the entry costs is depicted in Figure 2.

— Insert Figure 2 here —
For the parameter values in Region Vb, entry was profitable for neither firm before the
rise in sA . However, at a higher level of upstream spillover, it is a Nash equilibrium for
both firms A and B to enter. A higher level of upstream spillover increases the incentive for
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downstream entry by firm B, and anticipating this firm A chooses to enter as well. Therefore,
an increase in the level of technological spillovers upstream (sA ) induces additional entry at both
stages of production. Of course, a similar logic applies to changes in the level of downstream
spillover sB . A rise in sB enhances downstream competition and raises the demand for the
intermediate good, thereby encouraging upstream entry. Additional upstream entry in turn
leads to additional downstream entry which would not otherwise have occurred. To emphasize
this, we state the following result:10
Proposition 5: An increase in the degree of technological spillovers in either the upstream
or the downstream sector may encourage FDI into both tiers of the domestic industry.

4.3

Attracting FDI via subsidies

The above discussion informs us that one justification for attracting FDI in our vertical
oligopoly model is the technology spillovers that FDI might bestow upon local firms. However,
in many situations, multinational companies may lack the incentive to enter a host country
because of the entry costs involved or if technology spillovers benefit local competitors too
much.11 Because of such positive externalities, many countries often oﬀer fiscal and financial
incentives to multinational firms to induce them to invest locally (UNCTAD, 2003).
Suppose parameters are such that entry by both multinationals is indeed desirable from
a welfare perspective but firms do not find it profitable. Then, the host country government
faces a policy design problem: How should subsidies to FDI be structured? Should the local
government subsidize FDI at both levels or just one level of the industry? If at one level,
should it be upstream or downstream?
We argue below that properly designed FDI subsidization by the host country has the
potential to yield "multiple benefits" by encouraging entry at both levels of the local industry.
Suppose that the fixed costs of FDI (F and G) are suﬃciently large that {E, E} is not a Nash
equilibrium in the foregoing model. For instance, this will be the case when F > π AB
A and
> G > πB
π AB
B
B , that is, when no-entry is firm A’s dominant strategy (it would not enter
even if firm B enters: F > π AB
A ) and no-entry is firm B’s best response to firm A’s choice of
10

Of course, an increase in spillovers also has the usual eﬀect of discouraging entry. For example, an increase
in sA reduces πAB
A so that the vertical boundary defining Region III in Figure 3 shifts leftward and the parameter
space over which {E, E} is an equilibrium shrinks.
11
Furthermore, multinational firms will typically not take into account the beneficial eﬀects of their entry on
domestic consumers.
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no-entry but it prefers to enter if firm A chooses to enter. In this case, in the absence of an
FDI subsidy, no entry occurs and the host country remains in autarky.
There are at least three alternative FDI subsidization policies that the host country can
adopt:
(i) Subsidize only firm A by the amount just over F − π A
A;

(ii) Subsidize only firm B by the amount just over G − π B
B ; and

(iii) Subsidize both firms A and B.

It is easy to see that policy (i) can make Enter a dominant strategy for firm A, which
in turn induces firm B’s entry even though it does not receive any subsidy: firm A’s entry
increases the supply of the intermediate good which in turn makes it profitable for firm B to
enter as well. The net benefit of to the host country in this case is the increase in domestic
welfare minus the costs of FDI subsidy: W AB − W N − (F − π A
A ).

Policy (ii), if implemented, would attract firm B to enter but firm B’s entry would not be

accompanied by firm A’s entry because F > π AB
A . Unlike policy (i), policy (ii) attracts FDI
into just one level of the vertical industry. The net benefit of this policy to the host country
is W B − W N − (G − π B
B ). Therefore, policy (i) is more desirable than policy (ii) if and only if

B
B
W AB − (F − π A
A ) > W − (G − π B ).

From Proposition 3, we know that in the absence of FDI spillovers, simultaneously entry by

both firms lowers domestic welfare relative to FDI at just one level of the industry, because the
entry by one firm partially cancels out the vertical linkage eﬀects generated by the entry of the
other firm. However, if FDI spillovers are present and substantial, the host country can enjoy
spillover eﬀects at both stages of production if both firms choose to enter. In this case, policy
(i) can become the optimal FDI subsidization policy. For example, consider the case where
cA = cB = 0, cI = c = ∆, sA = sB = s, m = n = 2 and ∆ ≥ ∆min > 0. To make the point in

the clearest way and without loss of generality, assume that s = 1 (complete spillovers). Then,
2
we have W AB = 0.32a2 , W B = 0.35(a − ∆)2 , W N = 0.35(a − 2∆)2 , π A
A = (a − ∆) /24, and

2
πB
B = (a − ∆) /36. Hence, simultaneous entry by firms A and B enhances domestic welfare

and indeed domestic welfare is the highest under this entry pattern if ∆ is not too small.
B
Therefore, policy (i) is more desirable than policy (ii) if W AB −W B > (F −π A
A )−(G−π B ), i.e.,

if 0.32a2 − 0.28(a − ∆)2 > F − G.

AB
A
Similarly, for the case that G > π AB
B and π A > F > π A , in the absence of an FDI subsidy

it is the dominant strategy for firm B to not enter, and firm A enters only if firm B does.
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This implies that an FDI subsidy granted to firm B can induce both firms to enter, whereas
an FDI subsidy to firm A does not induce entry by firm B.
A general point can be made here. Due to the presence of complementarities in production, FDI subsidization at certain stages of an industry (in particular those with high entry
costs relative to post-entry profits) may generate multiple benefits to the host country by encouraging FDI inflows into other related production stages of the same industry or into other
vertically linked industries.
It was shown earlier in this paper that FDI into diﬀerent levels of a vertically industry of the
host industry may suﬀer from a coordination problem, namely it may be a Nash equilibrium
for both firms A and B to not enter the host country, even when each firm responds by entering
if the other firm chooses to enter (Proposition 1). It can easily be seen that for parameter
region where two Nash equilibria co-exist: {E, E} and {N, N }, the host country can subsidize
one of the firms and make Enter a dominant strategy for that firm. If so, the other firm will
choose to enter as well.
Of course, FDI subsidies by the host country are only an indirect solution to the coordination problem faced by firms A and B. In the next section, we consider vertical integration
between the two firms as a possible solution to the coordination problem and examine its
desirability relative to the entry of two independent firms. This analysis also allows us to shed
light on the welfare implications of the diﬀerent organizational forms of FDI.

5

Vertical integration and coordination

Suppose that firms A and B enter the host country as a vertically integrated firm, denoted
as firm V I, which makes the intermediate good in-house and then transforms it into the
final good. Upon entry, the integrated firm competes in the final good market with local
firms and has the option to supply the intermediate good to them. If it chooses to supply the
intermediate to local final good competitors, it also ends up competing with local intermediate
good suppliers.
Vertical integration oﬀers two main advantages to firms A and B. First, since the intermediate good can be secured at marginal cost by the vertically integrated firm, the integrated
firm does not suﬀer from the standard double marginalization problem faced by independent
firms. Second, the vertically integrated firm can coordinate its upstream and downstream entry decisions, thereby overcoming the no-entry equilibrium that can arise in the case of entry
18

by independent firms.
However, there is a subtle trade-oﬀ that the vertically integrated firm must also consider.
Post entry, such a firm needs to choose the extent to which it will supply the intermediate good
to its downstream competitors. On the one hand, demand for the intermediate good from such
local competitors represents a lucrative business opportunity for the integrated firm. On the
other hand, supplying the intermediate good to its competitors hurts the integrated firms’s
downstream business since increased competition in the intermediate market lowers the price
of the intermediate good. Therefore, it is not obvious whether, post entry, it is optimal for the
integrated firm to supply the intermediate good to its rival producers or not.
We next consider this incentive constraint in more detail and show that under the assumptions of our model, the vertically integrated firm chooses not to supply the intermediate good
to its competitors in order to protect its downstream business.

5.1

The VI firm’s incentive constraint

Let qV I denote the quantity of intermediate good that firm V I produces for its own use and
QV I the quantity it produces for sale to other downstream firms. In what follows, we show
that it is optimal for the integrated firm to set QV I = 0.
Given the intermediate price w determined by the competition among suppliers of the
intermediate good z, all downstream firms compete in Cournot fashion. The marginal cost of
production for the V I firm equals cA + cB while that for all other downstream firms equals
w + c − sB (c − cB ) since they purchase the intermediate good from upstream suppliers. The
derived demand for the intermediate good is Qd (w) ≡ q1 (w) + ... + qn (w), where qj (w) is the
Cournot quantity of the other firms in the downstream sector, 1 ≤ j ≤ n.

As an integrated unit, firm V I maximizes the sum of its upstream and downstream profits

π Vz I (QV I , Q−V I ) + π Vy I (w), where Q−V I denotes the aggregate output level
firms. Obviously, π Vy I (w) increases in w. Given Q−V I , the best response

of other upstream
of firm V I in the

upstream sector is determined by the following first order condition:
∂π Vz I (QV I , Q−V I ) ∂π Vy I (w) ∂w
+
= 0.
∂QV I
∂w ∂QV I

(5)

If QV I increases, the equilibrium price w of the intermediate good z goes down, which lowers
the costs of local downstream firms and thus hurts firm V I’s profit in the downstream market. Hence the second term on the left-hand-side of the equation captures the “helping the
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rivals eﬀect” created by the integrated firm’s decision to supply the intermediate to them:
I
∂π V
y (w) ∂w
∂w
∂QV I

< 0. The following result, proved in the Appendix, informs us that for linear

demand this negative eﬀect is so strong that the vertically integrated multinational chooses to
not sell the intermediate good it produces in-house to rival downstream producers:
Lemma 2: It is optimal for the vertically integrated multinational to not supply the intermediate good to its downstream rivals:

I
∂π V
z (QV I ,Q−V i )
∂QV I

+

I
∂π V
y (w)
∂w

< 0, for all Q−V I .

Thus, FDI by a vertically integrated multinational firm does not create any forward linkage
eﬀects for local final good producers.12 Nor does it generate any backward linkage eﬀects for
local intermediate suppliers, since it produces the intermediate good by itself.

Rather, the

derived demand for the intermediate good declines after the entry of the vertically integrated
firm by reducing the output of other downstream producers for any given w. However, relative
to the case of FDI by two independent firms (A and B), entry under vertical integration avoids
the double markup problem since the downstream unit of the integrated FDI firm buys the
intermediate good from the upstream unit at marginal cost; this tends to lower the price of
the final good and partly benefits the host country.
It is straightforward to derive the price of the intermediate good under vertical integration.
We have
wV I =

e
a + m [cI − sA ∆A ]
m+1

(6)

where e
a ≡ [a − 2(c − sB ∆B ) + cA + cB ] /2. The equilibrium output and profit of firm V I are
qV I =

and

respectively.

(2m + n + 2)(a − cA − cB ) + 2mn ((1 − sA )∆A + (1 − sB )∆B )
2(m + 1)(n + 2)
£
¤2
π V I (sA , sB , m, n) = qV I ,

(7)

(8)

Having described the behavior of the vertically integrated unit, we now turn to two central
questions. First, under what circumstances do the two firms find it beneficial to vertically
integrate? Second, how does domestic welfare under entry by the vertically integrated firm
compare with entry by independent firm A and B?
12

Note that this result need not obtain when demand is non-linear.
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5.2

Vertical integration versus uncoordinated FDI

While vertical integration overcomes the coordination problem faced by independent firms A
and B and also helps avoid double marginalization, it is not always more profitable for them to
vertically integrate since the vertically integrated firm V I foregoes profit that can be earned
by supplying the intermediate good to other downstream firms. This trade-oﬀ delivers the
following result:13
Proposition 6: Suppose cA = cI and cB = c. Then, for any given m, there exists an
nV I (m)

AB
VI
such that (i) π V I > π AB ≡ π AB
A +π B if and only if n < n (m) and (ii)

dnV I (m)
dm

> 0.

The proof of this proposition involves a straightforward comparison of the relevant profit
functions that can be solved for nV I — the analytical expression for which is somewhat tedious
and therefore not reported (we plot nV I (m) below in Figure 3). The intuition for part (i)
Proposition 6 is easy to grasp. Part (i) basically says that the incentive for a vertically
integrated firm to enter the host industry is stronger than that of two independent firms if and
only if the number of local final good producers is suﬃciently small — i.e. n < nV I (m). This
is because a reduction in the degree of downstream competition (i.e. a fall in n) lowers the
opportunity cost of not supplying the intermediate good to rival downstream firms whereas it
increases the degree of double marginalization problem. Both of these eﬀects reinforce each
other so that a decrease in n makes vertical integration relatively more attractive to firms.
Consider part (ii) of Proposition 6 which says that nV I (m) increases in m. The intuition
for this result is as follows: as the intermediate market becomes relatively more competitive,
the price of the intermediate good approaches marginal cost and profits earned from selling
the intermediate to local final good producers decline which in turn increases the incentive to
vertically integrate.
Taken together, the two parts of Proposition 6 point out that the incentive for vertical integration depends upon the degree of market competition at both stages of production. Holding
n constant, an increase in m makes vertical integration more attractive by reducing the profitability of selling the intermediate to local producers. On the other hand, holding m constant,
an increase in n makes vertical integration less desirable by increasing the opportunity cost of
not selling the intermediate to local final good producers.
Consider now the choice between the entry of a vertically integrated firm and that of two
13

For simplicity, we focus on the case without spillovers.
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independent firms from the viewpoint of the host country. We can show the following:
Proposition 7: Suppose cA = cI and cB = c. Then, there exists a threshold degree of
downstream competition nVw I (m) such that
W V I > W AB if and only if n > nVw I (m) where

dnVw I (m)
> 0.
dm

While the analytical expression for nVw I (m) is tedious, we can plot it using Maple (see
Figure 3) from where we observe that nVw I (m) > nV I (m). To understand the intuition behind
Proposition 7 it is useful to first consider a comparison of hV Ii and the FDI entry pattern hBi.

Note that since the vertically integrated firm does not supply local downstream competitors,
under both hV Ii and hBi competition increases (only) in the final good market. However,

there is a crucial diﬀerence between the two entry patterns: while the entry pattern hBi
creates additional backward linkages in the local industry by raising the derived demand for

the intermediate good, no such eﬀect arises under hV Ii since the vertically integrated firm does

not buy the intermediate locally but rather produces it in-house. But this beneficial backward
linkage eﬀect of entry pattern hBi relative to hV Ii has to be weighed against the fact that the

degree of double marginalization problem in the local industry is worse under hBi relative to
hV Ii — under hBi all downstream firms purchase the intermediate at a mark-up whereas under

hV Ii only local firms do so. Intuition suggests that when the number of downstream firms (n)
is large relative to the number of upstream firms (m), the increase in the derived demand or

the backward linkage eﬀect of entry pattern hBi would be minor whereas the degree of double

marginalization problem in the local industry would be significant due to the relative lack
of competition in the intermediate market. As a result, under such circumstances we would
expect domestic welfare to be higher under the entry pattern hV Ii relative to that under hBi.
Indeed, it is straightforward to show that W V I > W B if and only if n > 4m − 2.

Once the welfare comparison of hV Ii and hBi is understood, it is relatively easy to contrast

hV Ii and hABi. As we noted earlier in Proposition 2, the FDI entry pattern hABi yields lower

domestic welfare than the FDI entry pattern hBi for all m and n, due to the linkage-oﬀsetting
eﬀect inherent to hABi. Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that that nVw I (m) < 4m−2.

Proposition 7 and the preceding inequality together imply that a weaker parameter restriction
needs to be satisfied for domestic welfare under hV Ii to be higher than that under hABi.

Note the contrast between what foreign firms prefer and the welfare ranking of the host

country implied by Propositions 6 and 7. In particular, note that while vertical integration
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obtains whenever n < nV I (m), the domestic economy is better oﬀ under such integration
whenever n > nVw I (m). This implies the following corollary:
Corollary 1: If n > nV I (m), firms A and B choose not to vertically integrate whereas
domestic welfare is higher under vertical integration. If nVw I (m) ≤ n ≤ nV I (m), vertical

integration is preferred both by firms as well as the host country. Finally, if n < nVw I (m),

firms A and B prefer to enter as an vertically integrated firm whereas host country welfare is
strictly higher under independent entry.
— Insert Figure 3 here —
Figure 3 shows that there is harmony between choices of foreign firms and domestic welfare
only when both stages of production are relatively competitive. When the final good market
is relatively competitive and the intermediate good market less so, the firms choose not to
vertically integrate whereas the host country would be better oﬀ if they were to do so. By
contrast, when the intermediate market is quite competitive whereas the final good market is
not, the two firms prefer to vertically integrate whereas the domestic economy is better oﬀ
under separate entry.

6

Export-oriented FDI

Thus far, our analysis assumes that FDI firms sell all their output in the domestic market,
where they compete with local firms. In this section, we briefly discuss how our model is
modified if FDI is export-oriented rather than geared towards serving the domestic market.
We consider exporting of the final product only, i.e. either firm V I or B export only their final
products and their respective entries into the host country are motivated by the lower cost of
production and/or a cheaper supply of the intermediate good. Furthermore, for simplicity, we
assume that the domestic firms do not export, perhaps due to product quality considerations
and/or lack of overseas distribution channels etc.
If firm B exports all of its output to a foreign market, the competition eﬀect of its entry on
local final good producers is no longer present. However, the indirect eﬀect on local competitors
still exists: firm B’s local sourcing of the intermediate good raises its price and this hurts local
final good producers. This indirect eﬀect would be especially strong if the magnitude of its
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exports is large.14 . Thus, even in this case of export-oriented FDI, firm B’s entry may still
lower domestic welfare relative to autarky (unless it generates significant spillovers to local
firms).
Note also that this indirect eﬀect of firm B’s entry on the intermediate good market exists
regardless of whether firm A enters or not. If firm A also enters, the degree of competition
in the intermediate market increases and the indirect eﬀect of firm B’s entry is weakened.
However, under the entry pattern hABi, the linkage-oﬀsetting eﬀect identified in Proposition

2 come into existence. Hence, the result that domestic welfare may be lower if both firms A
and B enter relative to when only one of them enters would still hold.
A key question of interest in the context of export oriented FDI is whether the vertically
integrated firm would still find it optimal to not sell its intermediate good to competing local

V I denote that optimal quantity of the final product that the vertically integrated
firms. Let qEx

firm V I chooses to export, given its marginal cost of production cA +cB , the demand conditions
in the foreign market and any per unit transportation cost t incurred from exporting.
It is useful to consider two separate scenarios: one where the vertically integrated firm
exports all of its output and another where it serves both markets. In the first case, FDI in
the local economy is purely export-oriented and such FDI indeed occurs in many countries
in especially designated areas called export processing zones. When FDI is intended only for
exports, the vertically integrated firm does not compete with local final good producers (given
that they do not export). If so, there is no reason for the vertically integrated firm to not
supply the intermediate good to local producers (so that Lemma 2 no longer holds).15 The
profit of the vertically integrated firm then equals its profit from selling the intermediate good
in the local market, which is essentially the same as π A
A , plus its profit from exporting the final
product to the foreign market, π VExI . Interestingly, in this case a "must export" policy of the
host country not only shields local producers from competition with the vertically integrated
firm, it also ensures that they have access to the intermediate good produced by that firm. Of
course, the local suppliers of the intermediate good are likely to lose from competition from
14

For example, if the demand for the final product in the foreign market is given by pEX = β − yEX and firm
B is the monopoly supplier in that market, then the quantity of the intermediate good it buys from the host
B
country is yEX
= (β − cB − t)/2, where t is the transportation cost associated with exporting. If β is large, then
B’s entry will cause a large increase in the price of the intermediate good in the host country. It can be shown
that a result similar to Lemma 1 holds: i.e. the equilibrium price of the intermediate good rises following firm
B’s entry.
15
We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this diﬀerence between market-oriented FDI and exportoriented FDI.
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the vertically integrated firm when it chooses to serve local final goods producers.
Now consider the second scenario where the vertically integrated firm exports as well as
sells the final good in the domestic market. In this case, whether the firm chooses to supply
the intermediate to local final good producers depends on cost conditions. If, as is assumed
in the model here, the marginal cost of producing the final good is constant, then regardless
of the level of its exports, the vertically integrated always sells the final good in the domestic
market. In this case, it competes with local firms in the final good market and will therefore
choose not to supply the intermediate good to them because of the "helping the rivals" eﬀect
such supply creates. However, if the vertically integrated firm’s marginal cost of producing
the final good is not constant but increasing, and the foreign market is suﬃciently large, then
a rather large volume of exports can make it profitable for the firm to not sell its final good
in the domestic market. If this is the case, local competition in the final goods market is no
longer a concern and the vertically integrated firm will choose to sell the intermediate good to
domestic final good producers.
How does the possibility of exporting aﬀect the vertical integration decision? We argue
below that this choice can be aﬀected in either direction. To see this, consider the entry pattern
hABi where firms A and B enter the host country as separate firms. It suﬃces to consider the
case where firm B exports all its output. In this case, unlike the vertically integrated firm,

the entry of firm B generates backward linkage eﬀects for the host country, as its exports add
to the derived demand for the intermediate good. These linkages benefit local suppliers as
well as firm A. Relative to the case of V I, firm A’s profit is higher than π A
A because of the
increase in derived demand, whereas firm B’s profit, denoted as π B
Ex (w), is lower than that of
firm V I because firm B must buy the needed intermediate good in the domestic intermediate
market whereas firm V I makes the intermediate good in-house and secures it marginal cost.
As a result, the aggregate profits of firms A and B may be higher or lower than that of the
vertically integrated firm, depending on such factors as the demand condition in the foreign
market, the size of the transportation cost, as well as the nature of market structure (i.e. m
and n) at both stages of production.

7

Conclusion

In this paper, we construct a two-tier oligopoly model to analyze the incentives for greenfield
FDI and its eﬀects on diﬀerent stages of the local industry. The model is motivated by the
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simple observation that while real world FDI flows occur at various production stages of almost
all manufacturing and services industries, quite a few of which tend to be oligopolistic in nature,
existing literature has tended to focus mostly on FDI in final goods markets. Our two-tier
oligopoly model is built on the insight that the complementarity underlying various stages of
the production chain creates an interdependence in the FDI entry decisions of multinationals.
Such interdependence can in turn lead to a coordination problem: in our two-tier model, FDI
at both stages can fail to occur even when it is profitable for both foreign entrants. We argue
that a local subsidy to FDI at one level of the domestic industry can sometimes be suﬃcient
to induce FDI at both stages.
The two-tier structure of our model allows us to address some novel welfare questions. For
example, is FDI at both stages necessarily better than FDI at a single stage? We provide
conditions under which more FDI is better for the local economy as well as when it is not.
An important insight underlying this analysis is that if FDI occurs at both stages, part of the
vertical linkages created by FDI at any one stage are captured by FDI at the other stage. As
a result, the local benefits of FDI at one stage of the local industry can be muted by FDI at
the other stage. We show that only when the local industry is highly concentrated (or simply
non-existent) is FDI at both stages of production is necessarily preferable for the host country.
We also consider firm incentives for vertical integration and the impact such integration
has on local welfare. This analysis provides fresh insights regarding the impact various organizational modes of FDI have on firms as well as welfare. We show that from the viewpoint of
foreign entrants, vertical integration is not necessarily the optimal arrangement. This is due to
the following reasons. On the one hand, vertical integration helps coordinate entry decisions
and eliminates the double marginalization problem that arises when firms have market power
at both stages of production. On the other hand, the vertically integrated firm foregoes profit
that can be earned by supplying the intermediate good to other downstream firms — something
the vertically integrated firm does not find optimal to do. As a result, if the final good market
is suﬃciently competitive, the two foreign firms are better oﬀ entering as independent firms
as opposed to a vertically integrated one. For related reasons, from the viewpoint of the local
economy as well, vertical integration does not necessarily dominate entry by two independent
foreign firms.
While our model is rather stylized, it captures some novel and potentially important considerations that arise under a two-tiered production structure with market power at each stage.
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For example, we find that technology spillovers from FDI to a foreign firm’s local rivals can
actually encourage it to enter the local market. The intuition is central to the working of our
model: if technology diﬀuses in the final goods market, it increases derived demand for the
intermediate good making entry into that market more attractive which in turn makes FDI
into the final good market more attractive as well. Nevertheless, our model is only a first step
in the analysis of FDI at multiple stages of production of an oligopolistic industry since it
focuses largely on the host country. Future research could shed light on the incentives for and
eﬀects of such FDI in models in a multi-country environment.
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Appendix

Here we collect proofs and calculations omitted from the main text.
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) It can be shown that W A > W AB is equivalent to (2n2 + 2n − 1)m2 + 2mn2 + 2n2 +

2n − 2mn − 6m − 1 ≥ 0, which holds if and only if m = n = 1.

(ii) It is straightforward to show that W B > W AB is equivalent to (2m2 + 2m − 1)n2 +

(4m2 + 2m − 4)n + (6m2 + 8m − 1) > 0 which holds for all m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 1.
Proof of Proposition 3

It is straightforward to show that
WA − WN =

n(2 + n + 2m − 2mn − m2 n)(a − cI − c)2
(n + 2)2 (n + 1)2 (m + 1)2

which is positive if m = n = 1 and negative otherwise. This proves part (i). Similarly,
W

B

−W

N

¡
¢
m n2 + 3n + 2 − mn2 − mn + 5m (a − cI − c)2
=
(n + 2)2 (n + 1)2 (m + 1)2

which implies that (ii) holds.
If m = n = 1, W AB −W N =

¡

6
27

−

7
32

¢

(a − cI − c)2 > 0. For all other (m, n) 6= (1, 1), since

W A < W N by part (i) of this proposition and W AB < W A by Proposition 2, we have W AB
< WN.
Proof of Lemma 2

Given the price of the intermediate good, w, all downstream downstream firms compete in
quantities, yielding the the following equilibrium quantities
qV I (w) =

a − (n + 1)(cA + cB ) + n(w + c − sB ∆B )
,
n+2
27

(9)

for firm V I and
q1 (w) = ... = qn (w) =

a − 2(w + c − sB ∆B ) + cA + cB
,
n+2

for local downstream producers. The derived demand for the intermediate good is thus
Qd (w) = q1 (w) + ... + qn (w) = n

a − 2(w + c − sB ∆B ) + cA + cB
,
n+2

or equivalently
w=e
a−

n+2
n+2
Qd = e
[QV I + Q−V I ] ,
a−
2n
2n

(10)

where e
a ≡ [a − 2(c − sB ∆B ) + cA + cB ] /2.
The total profit of V I is
π Vz I + π Vy I

= (w − cA )QV I + (p − cA − cB )qV I
∙
¸
n+2
(QV I + Q−V I ) QV I
= e
a − cA −
2n
+ [a − cA − cB − (QV I + Q−V I + qV I )] qV I .

Straightforward algebraic simplifications yield
∂(π Vx I + π Vz I )
−2n(c − cB )(1 − sB ) − (n + 4)QV I − 2Q−V I
< 0.
=
∂QV I
2n
This completes the proof.
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Figure 1: Equilibria of the FDI Entry game
Region I: Entry is the dominant strategy for both firms A and B.
Region II: Entry is the dominant strategy for firm B and the best response for firm A.
Region III: Two Nash equilibria exist: either both firms enter or neither does.
Region IV: Entry is the dominant strategy for firm A and the best response for firm B.
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Figure 2: Effects of an increase in technology spillovers upstream (sA)
An increase in sA lowers both  AA and  AAB but raises  BAB . For parameter values of (F,
G) in Region Vb, FDI by neither firm is profitable before the increase in sA. At a higher
level of sA, however, it is a Nash equilibrium for both firms A and B to enter.
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Figure 3: Vertical integration versus independent entry

